Causes and Consequences of Cooperative arrangements
For a larger version, right-click the image and choose "Open image in a new tab"
The determinants of cross-border cooperative arrangements and the effect of cooperation on capital formation
Non-binding cooperative arrangements between securities regulators form the architecture for cross-border regulation of global capital markets, but little is known about these instruments, the structures they create, or their consequences for capital markets. Motivated by the idea that cross-border cooperation fosters better enforcement, can deter malfeasance, and ultimately reduce adverse selection, I test whether cross-border cooperation between securities regulators plays a role in the mobility of financial capital. I find that cross-border debt and equity issuance exhibits a strong association with cooperative arrangements—consistent with a reduction in information asymmetries and an expansion in investor protection in contexts where it is needed most.
Non-binding cooperative arrangements between securities regulators form the architecture for cross-border regulation of global capital markets, but little is known about these instruments, the structures they create, or their consequences for capital markets. Motivated by the idea that cross-border cooperation fosters better enforcement, can deter malfeasance, and ultimately reduce adverse selection, I test whether cross-border cooperation between securities regulators plays a role in the mobility of financial capital. I find that cross-border debt and equity issuance exhibits a strong association with cooperative arrangements—consistent with a reduction in information asymmetries and an expansion in investor protection in contexts where it is needed most.