This paper builds on the idea that SEC enforcement toward foreign firms has expanded by trying to determine why . I show that cooperative agreements, and more specifically IOSCO's Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU), is largely responsible for the increase. The staggered identification strategy (where the shock to enforcement capabilities via the MMOU varies across both time and country) is helpful in ruling out alternative explanations. After controlling for other factors, I show that the effect of the MMOU makes a firm about twice as likely to be the target of an SEC action. I go on to show that issuer reporting behavior changes in predictable ways. The earnings attributes of a U.S.-listed foreign firm’s financial reporting are different from a matched sample of U.S. firms prior to the MMOU. After the MMOU is in place, the financial reporting properties of the foreign firms converge toward U.S. firms. This provides empirical evidence that indicates that issuer reporting behavior changes when the threat of SEC enforcement increases. The full paper is available here.